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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
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INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9487
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9194
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4111
RUEHPK/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0709
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6439
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5299
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICFA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003733

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR MGN01 MUMBAI TASK FORCE

EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: MUMBAI SITUATION UPDATE

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

¶1. (C) Ambassador has returned and will see Chief of Army Staff General Kayani at 3 pm local time. Zardari is unavailable for meetings today.
¶2. (C) UK PM Gordon Brown is trying to call President Zardari today.
¶3. (C) NSA Durrani advised DCM that Zardari is meeting this evening with all of the Pakistani military chiefs to bring them up to date on the
¶4. (U) PM Gilani has called for an All Parties Conference on December 2 to discuss Indo-Pak relations in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. Invit
¶5. (U) Gilaini has canceled his planned trip to Hong Kong today. It is not clear if either Zardari or Gilani will attend the planned tripartit
¶6. (U) The press announced that the President, PM and Chief of Army Staff had agreed on a three-pronged policy to handle the situation:
--foster domestic political unity --plead Pakistan's case and clarify Pakistan's position (nfi) to the world --continue doing business with Inc
¶7. (C) Post continues to monitor GOP military activities. COAS Kayani told Ambassador December 1 that the Pakistani military has not increased
¶8. (S) We received a readout from the UK Embassy on their meetings/calls over the weekend. High Commissioner Brinkley and UK COS met President
¶9. (S) Zardari's response was positive; he said ISI had to follow up and this was an opportunity. He criticized the Indians for statements tha
¶10. (C) In the conversation with Miliband, Zardari said he saw the attacks as an "opportunity to strike at my enemies." The attack, he said, w
¶11. (C) Zardari told Miliband that "my people" had not brought specific information to him about the individuals named in the information pass
¶12. (C) Miliband described ISI MG Pasha as a welcome "new broom" and expressed UK support for ISI reform. Zardari said the new ISI leaders wer
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Pasha to go to India. Zardari gave Brinkley a long answer about various levels of directors in ISI but finally confirmed that the Army had vetc
¶13. (C) Zardari commented that he had a gut reaction that the attacks were the beginning rather than the end and went on to talk about Muslim-
¶14. (C) Miliband later called FM Qureshi and said the UK would be sure he saw the intelligence passed to ISI. He pressed that India needs acti
¶15. (C) High Commissioner Brinkley also called on Chinese Ambassador to Islamabad Hui over the weekend. Zardari had called Hui, and Hui said r
¶16. (C) See septel for special media reaction. Overall, the Pakistani public remains in denial about any culpability for the Mumbai attacks ar